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THE STATE OF PLAY
Worldwide economic recovery continues.
During the recovery process, economies are susceptible to
further negative shocks.
Negative shocks can dampen inﬂation expectations.
How to combate this possibility when policy rates are already
near zero?
Some of the material in this talk is based on my paper, "Seven Faces
of ‘the Peril’", which appeared in the September-October 2010 issue
of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review.THE STATE OF PLAY REACTIONS TO BENHABIB, ET AL. QE2: WAS IT EFFECTIVE? CONCLUSIONS
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CURRENT U.S. MONETARY POLICY
Near-zero policy rate.
Large quantitative easing program.
“Extended period” language for near-zero policy rate.
Conventional wisdom reaction to a negative shock: lengthen the
“extended period.”
Could this send the U.S. (and Europe) to a liquidity trap?THE STATE OF PLAY REACTIONS TO BENHABIB, ET AL. QE2: WAS IT EFFECTIVE? CONCLUSIONS
BENHABIB, SCHMITT-GROHE, AND URIBE
Consider a model with three generic features:
A Fisher relation.
A monetary authority which follows a Taylor-type policy rule.
The zero lower bound on nominal interest rates.
Models with these features possess an unintended steady state.
The unintended steady state is characterized by:
Short-term nominal interest rates at or near zero.
Inﬂation consistently below target.THE STATE OF PLAY REACTIONS TO BENHABIB, ET AL. QE2: WAS IT EFFECTIVE? CONCLUSIONS
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REACTIONS
Macroeconomists and policymakers are generally very
fragmented on this issue.
The following is a list of views, some formal, some informal.THE STATE OF PLAY REACTIONS TO BENHABIB, ET AL. QE2: WAS IT EFFECTIVE? CONCLUSIONS
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LEARNABILITY
Eusepi (2007, JME).
Global analysis.
Targeted equilibrium can be the sole learnable long-run outcome.
The Taylor-type rule has to respond only to past inﬂation.
But many other possibilities exist.
Cold comfort—a form of denial?
Evans-Guse-Honkapohja (2008, EER): intended steady state
locally but not globally stable under learning.THE STATE OF PLAY REACTIONS TO BENHABIB, ET AL. QE2: WAS IT EFFECTIVE? CONCLUSIONS
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FISCAL EXPANSION
Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, Uribe (2002, JPE), Woodford (2003,
Interest and Prices).
Aggressive ﬁscal expansion to avoid a liquidity trap.
Total government liabilities M+ B promised to grow at a rate in
excess of the nominal interest rate.
This eliminates the liquidity trap as a steady state equilibrium.
This approach is criticized by Atkeson, Chari, and Kehoe (2010,
QJE): implementation through extreme government response.
Impractical and dangerous in the wake of the European sovereign debt
crisis.
Japanese ﬁscal expansion nearing a debt-GDP ratio of 200 percent.THE STATE OF PLAY REACTIONS TO BENHABIB, ET AL. QE2: WAS IT EFFECTIVE? CONCLUSIONS
DETERMINISTIC PATHS FOR THE POLICY RATE
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2010, NBER Working Paper #16514).
Set a threshold for inﬂation below the target rate of inﬂation.
If inﬂation falls below the threshold, abandon the Taylor-type
policy rule.
Instead, follow a deterministic path for the nominal interest rate.
Involves raising policy rates independently of economic events.
Avoids the ﬁscal expansion.THE STATE OF PLAY REACTIONS TO BENHABIB, ET AL. QE2: WAS IT EFFECTIVE? CONCLUSIONS
QUANTITATIVE EASING
Successful for the U.S. and the U.K.
U.K. actual and expected inﬂation have remained higher.
Threats to permanently “monetize more debt” are more credible
than ﬁscal actions.
Reliably pushes inﬂation expectations higher.
Can be made state contingent in an appropriate way.
Japanese record shows that a temporary balance sheet expansion
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WHAT THE FOMC DID
The FOMC began slowing the run-off of the balance sheet in
August 2010.
Markets began pricing in additional action after the Chairman’s
Jackson Hole speech later in August.
The decision on QE was made at the November FOMC meeting.
Most effects were already priced into ﬁnancial markets at that
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CLASSICAL MONETARY POLICY EASING
These are the “classic” ﬁnancial market effects one might observe
when the Fed eases monetary policy in ordinary times (that is, in
an interest rate targeting environment).
Effects on the real economy would be expected to lag by six to
twelve months.
Real effects are difﬁcult to disentangle because other shocks hit the
economy in the meantime.
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CONCLUSIONS
The U.S. was susceptible to negative shocks which could
dampen inﬂation expectations.
This could possibly push the economy into a liquidity trap.
The conventional wisdom policy response to a negative shock is
to promise a longer “extended period.”
This may work—but it may also encourage a liquidity trap
outcome.
A better policy response to a negative shock is to expand the QE
program.